Th e International Criminal Court (ICC) recently celebrated the 10th year anniversary of the signing of its founding treaty, the Rome Statute. Th e Court is up and running, yet some aspects of substantive law, which could not be agreed upon in Rome or thereafter, continue to pre-occupy many minds. Th is article concerns the pre-conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the crime of aggression. As is well known, the ICC has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, yet it cannot exercise said jurisdiction until the crime of aggression has been defi ned and the conditions for the Court to exercise jurisdiction with respect to said crime have been set. It is this latter part that will be discussed thoroughly in the present article. Th is aspect of the crime of aggression is highly contentious because it encompasses both aspects of power politics involving the use of force and the UN Security Council, and the rule of law embodied in the ICC. It is at the crossroads of jus ad bellum and international criminal law, touching on both and in need of fi tting into both legal frameworks. Th e Security Council has the competence to determine the existence of an act of aggression, the ICC has the competence to determine the existence of a crime of aggression, and there is widespread consensus that a crime of aggression must include an act of aggression. Th is article was written in order to further stimulate informed discussion among a wide range of stakeholders involved in the negotiations on the crime of aggression. At the same time, it aims to provide a compromise solution and explains why it is essential to fi nd a concrete agreement which would fi nd overall support at the upcoming Review Conference of the ICC.
Th e 'Exclusivity Th esis' and its Merits
Th e main argument of Security Council involvement in the pre-conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression stems from an interpretation of Article 39 of the UN Charter. It is mainly the permanent members of the Security Council (P5) that have advocated that Article 39 entails the exclusive competence for the Security Council to determine whether an act of aggression has been committed. Th eir argument is corroborated by the fact that the Charter mentions aggression solely within the ambit of Security Council powers.
1 Supporters of this approach also argue that such an interpretation is in conformity with Article 5 (2) of the Rome Statute, which explicitly requires conformity with the UN Charter with regard to the defi nition and the exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, a strong involvement of the Security Council would ensure that the assessment of this important aspect of jus ad bellum is not unnecessarily fragmented. It could be an appropriate affi rmation of the Security Council's primary role to determine whether an act of aggression has been committed. Reading Article 39 closely, it becomes clear that it does confer a power on the Security Council; however, exclusivity cannot necessarily be inferred from it without an interpretation of the Charter as a whole.
2 Article 24 speaks of the Security Council's " primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security".
3 'Primary' insinuates that there is also a secondary responsibility, hence contravening the argument of exclusivity. Furthermore, even though this relates to the responsibility only, it indirectly also relates to the power to determine whether an act of aggression has been committed as this is one of the pre-conditions for exercising this responsibility by way of enforcement powers. 4 Practice corroborates this interpretation of the Charter. While in some instances practice has even contradicted the text of the Charter thereby de facto amending it 5 , with regard to the determination of an act of aggression, the practice does not support the Security Council's exclusivity thesis. Th e Security Council but also the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have made 1) Th e only exception being Art. 1 (1), which stipulates that the suppression of acts of aggression is one of the purposes of the United Nations. It could be inferred from this that being a purpose of the entire UN, determinations of aggression are not limited to the Security Council. 
